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 “[The high contracting parties] determined to lay 
the foundations of an ever-closer union among the 
peoples of Europe, (…) anxious to strengthen
the unity of their economies and to ensure 
their harmonious development by reducing the 
differences existing between the various regions and
the backwardness of the less favoured regions (…) have 
decided to create a European Economic Community.”
Preamble of the Treaty of Rome, 1957
“(…) the Community is not viable with its present 
degree of economic integration (…) the objective 
of a full monetary and economic union is 
unattainable without a political union.”
Nicholas Kaldor, 1971 (Kaldor 1978a: 202)
INTRODUCTION
The question may be asked in what way Nicholas Kaldor, who was primarily 
an economic theorist and economic policy adviser, can be related to European 
integration. In fact, the answer is: in many ways. This study aims at pointing out 
these links, by focusing on one specific aspect of European integration, namely 
the free movement of persons.
When the European Economic Community was established by the Treaty of 
Rome (TR) in 1957, the scene was obviously rather different than today. Further-
more, the TR was talking explicitly about two types of movements of persons: 
that of the workers and of the self-employed. A third category, the freedom of 
establishment, was also included in the TR, referring to individuals’ rights in 
relation to starting or running businesses in other member states. In the first dec-
ades of integration then, this free movement right was gradually expanded with 
several more categories.
The Single European Act, based on the convictions and sensibility of Jacques 
Delors, the then President of Commission, already introduced social, econom-
ic, and territorial cohesion as a basic objective of European integration. In fact, 
Delors saw some of the threats deriving from integration itself and, accordingly, 
some common policies were introduced to counterbalance certain unintended 
consequences of integrating regions or countries at different levels of economic 
development. Then, with the Treaty of Maastricht, together with the EU, the EU 
citizenship was also established. This implied a fundamental change in this par-
ticular free movement right. However, at that time, the challenges and their poten-
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tial magnitude were still not foreseen; we find very little and only marginal(ised) 
concerns about it.
Instead, the single currency project was launched and the euro was introduced 
in 1999. In parallel, the Eastern enlargement process was unfolding and, as a 
result, the EU was enlarged eastwards by 10+2+1 new member states (NMS) in 
2004, 2007, and 2013, respectively. Another major event, with fundamental con-
sequences for the European integration project, occurred in 2008 and the years to 
come: the global financial and economic crisis, and its specific European chap-
ter, the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, which imposed further pressure and con-
straints on advancing integration further. For years, saving the eurozone was the 
main concern, leaving little efforts to deal with other issues that did not appear as 
acute for the moment.
At present, we experience a factious and struggling EU that has survived the 
financial and economic crisis, but has entered an existential-type of crisis. We do 
not know in what direction events are unfolding in the time to come; uncertainty 
in relation to the future of European integration is perhaps greater than ever since 
the beginning. A considerable aspect of the current challenges is the ongoing 
intra-EU migration, which actually takes the prior form of the measurable move-
ment of active (often young, i.e. under 40 years of age), motivated and, to a large 
extent, well-educated workforce from the less prosperous periphery towards the 
much more resilient core. The trends imply social and, thus, political consequenc-
es in both the sending and the receiving countries. Impacts in the latter countries 
are communicated louder; suffice it here to recall the Brexit referendum and the 
preceding Vote Leave campaign. However, in our view, the consequences are in 
fact direr in the sending countries, for several reasons. The trends are not likely 
to change or turn.
Our main argument is that the current challenges of intra-EU migration could 
have been foreseen much earlier and that one source of explanations for what 
was going to come is the work of Nicholas Kaldor. In his writings and lectures, 
he pointed out to some highly relevant aspects of economic development and 
economic integration that are interpretable and, therefore, should be interpreted 
for the European integration project as well. In fact, Kaldor himself expressed his 
views on the common market and the idea of the common currency in the early 
1970s. These ideas of his are fully consistent with his full legacy and should be 
heeded even today.
Our goal is to show the relevance of Kaldor’s legacy in relation to European 
integration, and to the intra-EU migration challenge in particular, both at the the-
oretical and empirical levels. We believe it is never late to learn from our pred-
ecessors and to incorporate their wisdom into our work today.
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THE ORIGINAL SETUP OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
AND THE PRECEDING MAJOR ADVANCEMENTS REGARDING 
THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS
Even if the forerunner to European economic integration was the European Coal 
and Steel Community, established in 1951 following the 1950 Schuman Declara-
tion, the true beginning was the adoption of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. In Article 3, among the tools of the crea-
tion of the common market, we find “the abolition, as between Member States, of 
obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, services and capital”.
Thus, from the beginning, the EEC targeted the common market as the level 
of integration to be realised among its member states. In a common market, not 
only the outputs of production (i.e. goods and services) can be traded without 
any barriers, but also the factors of production (i.e. labour and capital) can move 
freely. Accordingly, the free movement of persons has been one of the funda-
mental building blocks of European integration. It has been so fundamental that 
questioning it has been virtually unimaginable. 
The economics behind the idea of the common market implies that greater ef-
ficiency can be reached if the market size is larger and if, besides goods and serv-
ices, the factors of production are also mobile, and thus factor markets are also 
more efficient. In fact, in neoclassical economic theory, free trade in commodities 
already brings about factor price equalisation without the need for factor mobility 
(Samuelson 1948). However, reality is not as simple as that. First of all, the factor 
price equalisation model (built up with two countries and two goods) assumes 
that commodity prices are the same in each country, the same technology is used 
in production, and both countries produce both goods. It is easy to see that reality 
is not likely to fully meet these criteria. Still, the models of international trade 
have continued to build on these assumptions, arriving at the conclusion that 
everybody gains from trade.
By studying the respective text of the TR in detail, the underlying rationale can 
easily be detected. Title III contains provisions on the free movement of persons, 
services, and capital. Under this title, Chapter 1 covers workers, and Chapter 2 
the right of establishment, still under the free movement of persons. Chapter 1 
starts with Article 48(1) declaring the practically unalienable right of the free 
movement of workers. The TR is explicitly talking about workers, not persons 
though, and then goes on to provide details of employment in another member 
state and reviewing the work to be done in the transitional period.
The right to be self-employed in another member state is then included in the 
first article of Chapter 2, Article 52 of the TR. The rest of the chapter covers the 
various forms and sets up the agenda for the European institutions in terms of 
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providing the legal background and ensuring a discrimination-free environment 
for the freedom of establishment across the EEC.
In effect, the freedom of persons was gradually expanded by secondary leg-
islation. Provisions covered the right to stay in another member state with the 
intention of finding a job, and also to remain for a certain period of time after ter-
mination of employment. Other legislation set the rules and conditions for social 
security, including the rights of the family members of employees. Later, several 
further categories were defined to which the free movement rights also applied, 
among them students, old-age pensioners, certain professionals, artists and other 
independent individuals, etc.
Then, the next major step in legal terms was the adoption of the Treaty on Eu-
ropean Union (TEU), or the Treaty of Maastricht. Among the resolutions of the 
high contracting parties listed in the Preamble, we can find commitments to “end-
ing of the division of the European continent”, “convergence”, and “economic 
and social progress”. The “objective to facilitate the free movement of persons” is 
also reaffirmed; moreover, European citizenship is called for. The concept of the 
“ever closer union” is repeated and the Treaty is “to advance European integra-
tion” by establishing the EU.
In the TEU, Part Two is about the “Citizenship of the Union”. There are several 
aspects of this legal category, but most important to our study is that according 
to Article 8a of TEU, “[e]very citizen of the Union shall have the right to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States”. With this provision, 
the free movement right was finally extended to the maximum: citizens of any 
member state of the EU enjoy free movement and cannot be divested of this right 
without any well-founded reason.
At this point, we must mention the free movement right debate and, we believe 
we may say, the crisis that broke out in the course of the accession negotiations of 
the post-socialist candidate countries in 2001–2002. While the acceding countries 
asked for, and actually were given, hundreds of temporary derogations regarding 
their application of EU law prior, upon, and preceding accession (Table 1), the 
European Commission, the other party at the negotiations, was on the other hand 
claiming this single one: that the free movement of workers from the NMS not be 
introduced upon accession, but only following a temporary period of restriction. 
The proposition was accompanied by a hot political debate, in fact both in the EU-
15 and in the accession countries. The former were not at all unified in this respect, 
some of them not finding it problematic at all, while others expressing major con-
cerns about their labour markets being flooded with poor migrants from the East 
(Schimmel 2006). At the same time, the latter group of countries were talking about 
second-class citizenship and unfair treatment. Romano Prodi, the then President of 
Commission, put immense efforts into reconciling the many positions. The solution 
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that was constructed eventually turned out to be adverse in the several-decade-long 
practice of European integration: in the absence of an EU-level solution, temporary, 
at most 7 years of restriction (in a 2+3+2 system) could be imposed by old member 
states individually – but only if they intended to do so. Unsurprisingly, the vast ma-
jority of the countries did decide to impose such restrictions, with the United King-
dom, Sweden, and Ireland being the only exceptions in 2004 (Schimmel 2006).1
Nothing similar has ever occurred in relation to setting up the eurozone, man-
aging the crisis, or any other event of similar scale in terms of the challenges they 
posed to integration and the free movement of persons. We can only regard the 
Cameron-Council UK-EU deal of February 2016 (EUCO 2016) as a comparably 
challenging event of European integration. The Council Decision summing up 
the results of these negotiations concerned, among others, the free movement of 
persons. The Decision expresses joint (UK-EU) commitment to strengthen the 
internal market, of which the free movements of good, persons, services, and 
capital are inherent compounds. Then the text acknowledges some very impor-
tant aspects regarding the free movement of persons, including the challenges 
arising from the differences in the levels of social security among the member 
states. Eventually, the Decision concluded that some discretionary measures on 
behalf of member states might be justifiable on these grounds. As we know, on 
1  We find it important to note that the restrictions applied only to employment, but not to the 
freedom of establishing enterprises, to study in another EU member state, etc.
Table 1. Number of derogations given to the 2004 accession countries by types
Countries A B C D TOTAL
Cyprus 8 12 1 2 23
Czech Republic 8 6 2 16
Estonia 13 7 1 3 24
Hungary 10 13 8 31
Latvia 22 8 7 37
Lithuania 17 6 4 27
Malta 17 10 4 17 48
Poland 21 14 1 13 49
Slovakia 14 6 1 4 25
Slovenia 13 4 1 4 22
TOTAL 143 86 9 64 302
Notes: A: “shall not apply” or “shall postpone” the application of the acquis during a certain period of time; 
B: “may maintain” or “shall gradually adjust” the national legislation; C: “may grant” state aid, financial as-
sistance, etc.; D: other types (“shall be excluded”, “may exempt”, “may consider”, “shall be notified”, “shall 
object”, “may set”, “may provide”, “may open”). No permanent derogations were granted to the NMS.
Source: Ivanica (2003: 32).
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June 23, 2016, the majority of British voters decided that the UK should leave the 
EU. This way the UK-EU deal lost its relevance and legitimacy.
In our view, though, the Decision was indeed a moment of truth for the EU in 
relation to the free movement of persons. Up to that moment, this fundamental 
building block of European integration had never been challenged. However, we 
are all aware of the outcome of the Brexit referendum and thus, most unfortunate-
ly, the solutions to the social, political and, in fact least importantly, economic 
challenges, whose seeds were sown in this Decision, are not on the table, again. 
Instead, business as usual is to go on, while questioning the free movement rights 
in relation to persons apparently continues to remain a taboo, despite the warning 
that the Brexit referendum has sent.
THE CHALLENGE AT THE THEORETICAL LEVEL IN KALDOR’S VIEW
Nevertheless, the basic setup of the single market with its four freedoms had 
originally been designed, though rather implicitly, for an economic area where 
internal imbalances were modest. In fact, these freedoms have serious, originally 
unintended consequences in the 21st-century EU, in which this original condition 
of moderate internal differences no longer applies. Nicholas Kaldor had actually 
warned about some inherent flaws of European integration many decades ago. 
Some of his warnings were indirect (i.e. those on the consequences of interre-
gional trade), but some were direct (expressed in relation to the UK’s accession to 
the EEC in the early 1970s). In the following, we offer a brief overview of some 
of his lectures and writings that we believe are in some way related to our topic: 
the built-in challenges of European integration.
Our first source is a book containing Kaldor’s lectures delivered at Yale Uni-
versity in 1983. Following the sudden and tragic death of Okun in 1980, a series 
of Arthur M. Okun Memorial Lectures was initiated at Yale in October 1983. 
James Tobin’s preface to the book containing three lectures (Kaldor 1985) praises 
Kaldor as an original and insightful economist who, throughout his career, had 
preserved his free spirit and independent mind – just as Okun had done. Kaldor’s 
third lecture in this memorial lecture series was “Interregional trade and cumu-
lative causation”. In the current of thought flowing through the lecture, Kaldor 
strove to explain why he thought that the market economy setup was a dead-end 
in its known form. In relation to the subject of our current analysis, the relevance 
of this particular lecture lies in the highly logical description of what Kaldor 
called, after Myrdal (1957), “cumulative causation”. Kaldor also refers to Allyn 
Young’s 1928 article in so far as that when there are increasing returns, eco-
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nomics takes a different turn from what neoclassical models imply, namely that 
change becomes endogenous. 
If, in this theoretical setting, we take interregional trade (in other words, the 
exports of regions) into consideration, we witness a growing division of labour 
as an outcome. Taking Young’s idea further, Kaldor points out that, “with an in-
crease in the division of labour, capital and output grow together” (Kaldor 1985: 
67), resulting in the tremendous accumulation of capital in certain regions, but 
no advancements of any similar scale in other, less developed areas. The former 
regions will, with the passing of time, become capital-intensive geographical 
centres where most of the technological progress takes place (Thirlwall 1983), 
contributing to even higher returns there.2 As an obvious consequence, industry-
driven output growth results in productivity growth in the above-described re-
gions enjoying more favourable positions (Thirlwall 1983). This is also known as 
Kaldor-Verdoorn’s Law (Targetti 2005). 
In the Okun memorial lecture, Kaldor proceeds with his argument, contending 
that Samuelson’s factor price equalisation theorem does not apply (Kaldor 1985). 
Instead, interregional trade increases the overall market size (another element of 
endogenous change), from which the more capital-intensive regions are able to 
benefit more (and more), a further process leading towards increasingly greater 
disparities. Thus, trade may well enlarge previously existing regional differences 
in productivities ever further.
The term cumulative causation in the spatial context refers to the fact that these 
trends are all self-reinforcing and thus, without any policies targeting the mitiga-
tion of the diverging effects, economic development will result in ever growing 
regional disparities – quite the opposite to the original intention behind European 
integration. As Kaldor puts it, “some regions gain at the expense of others, lead-
ing to increasing inequalities between relatively prosperous and relatively poor 
areas” (Kaldor 1985: 75). All in all, what Kaldor is saying is that the benefits of 
trade are not equally shared among the trading regions, but that the more devel-
oped regions persistently benefit more than the less developed ones.
The same problem had been discussed by Kaldor earlier, in his essay on re-
gional policies (Kaldor 1978b), although from a slightly different perspective. 
In a lecture originally delivered in Scotland in 1970, Kaldor addressed the re-
gional problem of the United Kingdom. After thoroughly reviewing the concept 
of “region” in economic theory and the role of “resource endowment” (Kaldor 
1978b: 140), he presents the same argument as above, namely that even the most 
minor initial differences may grow so large over time as a by-product of reg-
ular economic development that, eventually, some regions will be condemned 
2 This argument is laid out in detail and with methodological rigour in Kaldor (1961).
INTRA-EU MIGRATION AND KALDOR’S LEGACY 183
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
for constantly aggravating underdevelopment in relation to the most prosperous 
ones. Nevertheless, Kaldor continues with assessing macroeconomic policies that 
could be used by the British government to handle these within-country regional 
inequalities. If we compare within-country regions to between-country regions, 
argues Kaldor, labour mobility is considerably larger in the former case and, as 
regards the latter relation, currency devaluation can be used to sustain external 
balance. Furthermore, in the within-country context, a national regional policy 
can be designed and implemented, and the national budget may serve as a finan-
cial resource to it. (In this respect, the biggest difference between a country and 
the EEC is that the former has a budget to finance its policies, while the common 
European budget is unsuitable for serving such goals.) Somewhat interestingly, 
Kaldor finishes his 1970 lecture with this sentence: “But these are thoughts for 
the distant future; long before they become practical politics we shall be deeply 
involved in the same kind of issues in connection with our negotiations to enter 
the Common Market” (Kaldor 1978b: 154).
It is widely known that at the time when the United Kingdom was negotiating 
accession to the European Economic Community (the Common Market), Kaldor 
was not at all in favour of accession. His main argument was related to what he 
saw as a major built-in flaw of European integration, namely that according to the 
Werner Plan published at the time, an economic and monetary union was to be 
established ahead of a political union. In Kaldor’s view, this was a fundamental 
mistake in several respects (Kaldor 1978a).3 First, due to the already discussed 
cumulative causation, especially in a currency union, “relatively fast-growing 
areas tend to acquire a cumulative competitive advantage over relatively slow 
growing areas” (Kaldor 1978a: 192), leading to increasing differences in produc-
tivity, which then results in the enhancement of the competitive advantage of the 
better-off regions over the less developed ones. Second, the monetary union nec-
essarily requires at least some Community control over national budgets which, 
instead of leading towards political integration, would have a fully adverse effect. 
Third, as a joint consequence of economic and monetary integration and cumula-
tive causation, “some countries will tend to acquire increasing (and unwanted) 
surpluses in their trade with other members, whilst others face increasing defi-
cits” (Kaldor 1978a: 202). 
Therefore, European integration would only be viable, says Kaldor, back in 
1971, if there was real fiscal integration (and not just fiscal harmonisation) pre-
ceding the monetary union. Returning again to his idea that regular economic 
development in an integrated trade area results in growing inequalities between 
3  Kaldor wrote the original essay, published in 1971, as a counterargument to the UK’s acces-
sion to the EEC (King 2009).
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more and less prosperous regions, he states in relation to the fiscal integration he 
regarded as being inevitable that “[w]ith an integrated system of this kind, the 
prosperous areas automatically subside the poorer areas; and the areas whose ex-
ports are declining obtain automatic relief by paying in less, and receiving more, 
from the central Exchequer. The cumulative tendencies to progress and decline 
are thus held in check by a ‘built-in’ fiscal stabiliser which makes the ‘surplus’ 
areas provide automatic fiscal aid to the ‘deficit’ areas” (Kaldor 1978a: 205). 
The very fact that such a system was not intended to be launched in the EEC at 
that time was the main reason for Kaldor’s opposition to the UK’s accession. He 
continued with a criticism of the Community’s initiatives for regional aid, claim-
ing that “a central system of taxation” (Kaldor 1987a: 206) would be a much 
more viable instrument for fulfilling the purpose of reducing within-Community 
regional disparities – something that the foreseen common actions were not likely 
to achieve, in Kaldor’s view.
In the 1970s, Kaldor did not pursue his thoughts on European integration any 
further. As we know, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the 1970s 
recessions washed away the full realisation of the Werner Plan. Jacques Delors, 
President of the European Commission in the 1985–1995 period, was the next 
European leader who took up the issue of advancing European integration fur-
ther. The Single European Act was adopted in 1986, the Delors Report on the 
introduction of the common currency was presented in 1989, and the euro was 
in fact introduced in 1999, according to the plans, though not across the entire 
EU as originally intended. As Kaldor died in 1986, we do not know his views on 
these latter advancements. Nevertheless, if we read the Delors Report, we see that 
the Committee was indeed aware of the internal differences challenge so clearly 
explained by Kaldor: “Community policies in the regional and structural field 
would be necessary in order to promote an optimum allocation of resources and 
to spread welfare gains throughout the Community. (…) Economic and monetary 
integration may have beneficial effects on the less developed regions of the Com-
munity. For example, regions with lower wage levels would have an opportunity 
to attract modern and rapidly growing service and manufacturing industries. (…) 
Historical experience suggests, however, that in the absence of countervailing 
policies, the overall impact on peripheral regions could be negative. (…) Wage 
flexibility and labour mobility are necessary to eliminate differences in competi-
tiveness in different regions and countries of the Community. Otherwise there 
could be relatively large declines in output and employment in areas with lower 
productivity. In order to reduce adjustment burdens temporarily, it might be nec-
essary in certain circumstances to provide financing flows through official chan-
nels” (Delors Report 1989: Art. 29). 
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Even if so, the reformed regional and structural policies introduced by the 
Delors Commission from 1989 onwards have simply proved inadequate in size 
(mainly) compared to the effects arising from integration and the introduction of 
the single currency. Thus, their original goal to operate as countervailing policies 
has largely failed. In his memoirs, Alexandre Lamfalussy, who was a member 
of the Delors Committee drafting the Report, and a close colleague of Jacques 
Delors throughout the process of establishing the monetary union, acknowledged 
that the biggest mistake of the Delors Committee was that the competitiveness 
problem was mismanaged, which then came to the surface with the 2008 crisis 
(Lamfalussy et al. 2013). It seems that Kaldor was right and time is justifying 
him. Let us see what has happened in the EU in this respect.
THE CHALLENGE IN REALITY
In this section, we aim at showing empirically that Kaldor’s warnings are to be 
taken seriously. In fact, the more developed parts (countries, regions) of the EU 
are much more attractive both for capital and for persons than the parts lagging 
behind. Kaldor had pointed out the large-scale capital accumulation processes 
in the more developed regions, as we demonstrated above. He did not consider 
labour movements, most probably because those were marginal in the EEC of 
the 1970s. However, this no longer being the case, our analysis targets the issue, 
based on Kaldor’s reasoning. The cumulative causation appears to apply in rela-
tion to persons, not just capital, also enjoying free movement across the EU.
In the previous years, two large-scale events have contributed to the accelera-
tion of intra-EU migration. First and foremost, with the Eastern enlargements, 
internal differences in economic development across the EU have reached new 
records. At the same time, the recent financial and economic crisis has brought 
about a prolonged crisis in the eurozone periphery, a crisis of not only an eco-
nomic, but also of a social and political nature. We are not going to describe these 
here, but shall restrict ourselves to introducing some evidence that we believe are 
linked to Kaldor’s theoretical considerations regarding the realities of European 
integration, and are in fact proving Kaldor in practice.
In our empirical investigation, we consider three elements of economic per-
formance (while being fully aware that there may be many other relevant as-
pects): economic growth, GDP per capita, and employment in persons. We re-
view trends on a broader time scale, from 1994 onwards, for two reasons: that 
was the year when the convergence period prior to the introduction of the single 
currency started, and it was the very same year when the Europe Agreements with 
the Central Eastern European countries (CEECs) aspiring for EU membership 
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entered into force (within the legal framework of the EU, and European citizen-
ship, described at the beginning of this article).
Accordingly, in order to show the persistent intra-EU differences, we have 
created three groups of countries: the core of the EU, the eurozone periphery, and 
the post-socialist NMS (Table 2). Unfortunately, data for 1994 were incomplete 
in the Eurostat database, so we had to take 1995 as our initial year. (As regards 
employment data, the first year when the complete database was available for the 
countries under investigation was 1999, so our analysis of employment trends 
starts at that year.) Because of the above-mentioned milestones of European in-
tegration that we claim have an impact on the investigated phenomena, we have 
created the following periods:
–  1994–1999: from the start of the convergence period to the introduction of the 
euro (for the eurozone periphery); from the entering into force of the Europe 
Agreements to launching accession negotiations (for the CEECs);
–  1999–2004: from accession negotiations to the first, biggest round of the East-
ern enlargement;
–  2004–2009: from the first round of the Eastern enlargement to the worst crisis 
year;
–  2009–2013: the crisis years;
–  2013–2015: post-crisis years.
First, we present the results of our analysis concerning accumulated growth in 
the country groups (Figure 1). If we only look at the overall performance over the 
whole period (1995–2015), there is no room for concern or criticism: the post-
socialist NMS have accumulated more than double the growth of the core, and 
the eurozone periphery has outperformed the core as well.4 However, the picture 
is considerably gloomier if we take a look at the accumulation of growth in the 
respective periods. As for the eurozone periphery, everything was according to 
expectations until 2009: the less developed periphery has tendentiously grown 
more than the core. In fact, over the 1995–2009 period, the accumulated growth 
4 Growth data are nominal.
Table 2. Grouping of EU member states
Country groups Countries in the group
Core of EU Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Austria, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom
Eurozone periphery Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal
Post-socialist NMS Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia
Note: Croatia, Cyprus, and Malta are not members of any of the above groups.
INTRA-EU MIGRATION AND KALDOR’S LEGACY 187
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
of the eurozone periphery in 2009 was 200.6%, while the respective performance 
of the core was 149.4%. However, this advantage of the eurozone periphery has 
practically vanished since the outburst of the crisis; between 2009 and 2015, the 
core accumulated almost ten times more growth (+25.6%) than the eurozone pe-
riphery (+2.9%) did during the same period.
The Eastern enlargement was special in that post-socialist transition econo-
mies joined the integration with their specific heritage and institutional setting 
(Farkas 2011). Evidently, the growth potential in these countries was initially 
much higher than in the developed old EU member states due to the fact that they 
were in the course of catching up. Therefore, it is not surprising that the growth 
rates, and thus the accumulated growth, in the post-socialist NMS reached much 
higher levels than the respective performance of the core EU countries. The accu-
mulation of growth in the NMS appear to have gained an additional momentum 
with the 2004 enlargement: at that time, these ten NMS were able to realise an 
overall +53.9% growth in just 5 years’ time (2004–2009). However, similarly to 
the eurozone periphery, although not as severely, these countries were also hit 
by the outburst of the crisis in 2009. Since then, they have accumulated +26.5% 
growth, which is just slightly above the respective performance of the core.
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We are aware that both groups of the periphery include two exceptions: Ireland 
and Poland. It is beyond the scope of this study to explain their special status in 
detail, but, among other specificities, both stand out from their groups in terms 
of growth, although for Poland this only applies for the post-2004 period during 
the years of EU membership. Accordingly, we were interested in looking at the 
two groups’ performance, excluding these two members from their respective 
groups. Our findings show that our intuitions were right for the eurozone for all 
interim periods and overall as well, while we were right in respect of the group 
of the post-socialist countries in all periods but the 1999–2004 years and thus the 
overall period (Table 3).
All in all, we can say that prior to the crisis, convergence was underway in the 
EU: both the eurozone periphery and the post-socialist NMS were catching up 
with the most developed core. However, the crisis put an end to these favourable 
trends and, looking at the post-crisis period (2013–2015), even if it may be too 
short a time for drawing far-reaching conclusions, the return of convergence has 
not occurred yet.
While we were comparing these country groups across the years, the question 
was raised what exactly their weights have been in the EU economy and how 
these relative weights have changed through the years. Figures 2 and 3 show the 
answers to this question. Very obviously, the core was, and still is, absolutely 
dominating the EU economy: from 1995 to 2015, even with much lower rates of 
accumulated growth, its weight has decreased from 73.9% only to 69.3%.5 The 
eurozone periphery’s weight is almost the same in 2015 as it was twenty years 
earlier. However, in the meantime, there were considerable internal processes: 
until 2009, the eurozone periphery grew as large as 26.3% per cent of the EU 
economy, before starting to lose its relevance again to the benefit of the core, 
which stood at 66% in 2009 and then started to relatively grow again.
5  Though this may change with the United Kingdom exiting the EU – but analysing this is be-
yond the scope of this study.
Table 3. Accumulated growth in certain groups of EU member states, 1995–2015, %
Country groups 1995–1999 1999–2004 2004–2009 2009–2013 2013–2015 1995–2015
Eurozone periphery 131.4 132.7 115.0 97.7 105.3 206.4
Eurozone periphery 
(without Ireland) 129.9 131.1 115.4 97.3 103.1 197.0
Post-socialist NMS 137.7 151.6 153.9 117.1 108.0 406.1
Post-socialist NMS 
(without Poland) 131.8 167.9 153.9 112.9 107.8 414.5
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat data.
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Figure 2. The weights of the country groups in the EU economy, 1995 and 2015, %
Notes: CR+CY+MT: Croatia, Cyprus and Malta.
Source: Own calculations and edition based on Eurostat data.
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The relative weight of the post-socialist economies grew steadily from the 
beginning of the reference period until 2008 when they accounted for 7.6% of 
the EU economy. However, in the next year, their weight fell back to a local 
minimum of 7.1%. Since 2011, this group of countries has held about a 7.5% 
share in the EU economy. Just for the record, the latest comer Croatia and the two 
small islands in the Mediterranean, Cyprus and Malta, have together had a share 
between 0.4% (1995) and 0.6% (2009) of the EU economy.
The next aspect that we analyse is the GDP per capita (current prices) in the 
EU member states. We again consider the 1995–2015 period. Figure 4 shows 
the standard deviation, the average distance from average, and the average across 
the countries’ data in all years of the reference period. What does the figure tell 
us? Very briefly: there is no convergence in the EU in terms of GDP per capita 
but, quite to the contrary, both standard deviation and average distance from 
average have been growing during almost the entire period. The only exception 
from these trends was the pre-crisis period 2007–2009 – but we all know that the 
price and wage bubbles in the periphery have burst and that the diverging trends 
have returned. Thus, those 3 years of convergence were not real, but bubble - 
(and credit-)driven.
Before turning to the analysis of the employment trends in the country groups, 
we must devote a few words to the competitiveness challenge. In order to show 
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the internal competitiveness divide in the EU, we consider the Global Compet-
itiveness Index scores of the EU member states according to the latest report 
(2016–2017). The GCI score is an index generated from 114 sub-indicators com-
prising both hard data (e.g. public debt to GDP ratio, export to GDP ratio, patent 
applications per million inhabitants, etc.) and soft data coming from the Execu-
tive Opinion Surveys carried out in the participating countries. Much criticism 
has been levelled at the methodology, even if there is sound and well-founded 
economics behind it (Sala-i-Martin 2010). 
In Figure 5, we have put the 2015 GDP per capita data and the 2016–2017 GCI 
scores on the two axes of the chart. The EU countries form two distinct groups: 
there is a core (including Ireland) and a periphery (constructed by the southern 
eurozone and the NMS – the distinction between these two sub-groups is no 
longer more clear-cut). Ireland is in an exceptional position, but otherwise the 
divide is obvious, just as the positive and strong correlation (R2=0.7068) between 
the two dimensions.
Finally, we examine employment data. As mentioned above, we only had 
complete datasets for the EU from 1999 onwards, this being the reason that we 
start our investigation from this year. In order to show the full realities, we do not 
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consider employment rates (as they may remain stable even if there is emigra-
tion), but employment in persons. Figure 6 shows the trends in the core of the 
EU, the eurozone periphery, and the post-socialist NMS. The picture is rather 
different from that of accumulated growth. The overall employment growth for 
the whole reference period (1999–2015) was the largest for the eurozone periph-
ery (+18.2%), but most of this increase occurred in the first ten years of the euro. 
In the 2009–2013 crisis period, employment change in the eurozone periphery 
was minimal (+0.7%) and there has even been minor decrease (–0.2%) since 
the crisis.
The second biggest employment growth in persons was realised in the core of 
the EU: +10.4% in the overall period. Moreover, the core managed to increase 
the number of employed persons in all periods, even during the crisis. Last, but 
not least, the post-socialist member states are taken into consideration. Sadly, the 
overall employment in persons changed negatively in the overall period, even if 
by a small rate only (–0.2%). Of the four interim periods, the post-socialist NMS 
witnessed negative change in two (1999–2004, 2009–2013). The first might still 
be related to transition, but the second has definitely to do with the joint effects of 
the crisis and the free movement of persons in the EU.
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Returning to the above-mentioned competitiveness divide, we have to mention 
that it evidently has a quality dimension as well. This lies in the fact that the core 
countries enjoy structural competitiveness, while the periphery is in a much less 
favourable position. Indeed, the core countries of the EU are the ones where most 
of the development of frontier technologies takes place in the EU. These countries 
are much more capital-abundant, and thus able to create high value-added and re-
alise high income through selling high-end products and services in and outside 
the EU. At the same time, the periphery countries (particularly of the eurozone , 
but also of the EU overall) had to undertake painful adjustments in managing 
the crisis. These latter have been constrained to internal devaluation (eurozone 
periphery) or currency devaluation (non-eurozone periphery of the EU), and thus 
have slipped into (wage-)cost competitiveness. Their competitors are present to 
an increasing extent in the emerging part of the world, dooming them to lower 
added value and lower income levels in the longer term (Pelle 2015a). These 
trends are unlikely to end or turn soon, and may well provide explanations to the 
above-described post-crisis divergent trends in the EU.
All this is putting pressure, among others (e.g. political forces), on the free 
movement rights as well, as the more developed parts of the EU are much more 
attractive, not only for capital, but also for persons. Moreover, moving is be-
coming easier with the transport and communication technologies and costs 
of our times. If we look at intra-EU migration in the 21st century, we see that 
its scale is larger than ever, and is dominant in a one-way direction: from the 
periphery towards the core (Hárs 2016). In fact, in 2014, more than half of all 
intra-EU migrants were from the post-socialist NMS, with Romanian and Bul-
garian citizens dominating within this group (Andor 2014). In many cases, the 
devastating economic situation in the peripheral countries appears as the major 
push factor of intra-EU migration (Hárs 2012) and thus, in fact, people do not 
emigrate for fun, but out of economic necessity. Looking at the demographic 
trends in more detail,6 there is another internal underlying and seemingly un-
stoppable trend: people are at the same time moving from rural areas towards 
urban areas – again, from less prosperous to more developed regions. Intra-EU 
migrants are typically (younger) working age, willing to work, better educated 
than the home population, commanding demanded skills, talented, and moti-
vated – often much more so than the home population that they leave behind 
(Blaskó 2014; Hárs 2016).
Actually, what we see is that practically whatever dimension we look at, we 
find largely similar intra-EU divergence patterns, be it the distance from Europe 
2020 targets (WEF 2014), especially in relation to the social inclusion indica-
6 http://www.bbsr.bund.de/BBSR/DE/Home/Topthemen/bevoelkerung_europa.html 
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tors (Pelle – Laczi 2015; B. Kis – Gábos 2016), participation in the research 
and development framework programmes of the EU (Pelle 2015b), or the overall 
readiness for embracing the fourth industrial revolution (Kuruczleki et al. 2016). 
European integration is definitely to be revisited.
CONCLUSIONS
The Preamble of the Treaty of Rome spoke about an ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe, the economic and social progress of member states by 
common action to eliminate the barriers, constant improvements of the living 
and working conditions of the people, strengthening unity, ensuring harmoni-
ous development by reducing the differences between various regions and the 
backwardness of the less favoured regions, and pooling resources to preserve and 
strengthen peace and liberty.
Rather obviously, in the 21st-century EU, these promises cannot be fulfilled. 
The mistake is not in the original ambitions, but in the setup of European integra-
tion, in that the policies dedicated to ensure cohesion are inapt for fulfilling the 
purposes for which they were initiated. This study did not analyse the deficien-
cies of these policies, but showed their failure through economic realities. Nicho-
las Kaldor had depicted these economic processes, starting in the 1960s. Even 
if we can find track of his ideas embraced by the European integration project, 
especially by Jacques Delors, the scale of the challenges appear to prevail over 
the scale of the success of policies to countervail them.
Another reason for the failures is that compared to the beginnings of European 
integration, not enough has been changed in the fundamental framework. Evi-
dence shows that the original setup is unsuitable for the current European realities 
in the sense that it no longer guarantees the steady and balanced improvement of 
living standards across the EU. The issue should be addressed at the EU level as 
the problems are not manageable at the member states’ level, precisely because 
the major root of the problems is integration itself, with its imperfect construct 
regarding the handling of persistent differences in the levels of development, 
growth, and attractiveness across member states. 
Kaldor’s projections were right in relations to these trends, even if he did not 
address the intra-EU migration of persons at that time, as it was not yet a problem. 
What he did predict correctly was that European integration would not improve 
the situation of the periphery very much. On the other hand, of course, it remains 
an unanswerable question what development path these countries would have 
followed in the absence of EU membership. All in all, Kaldor’s clear-sightedness 
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is much in demand today and in fact his implications still apply. As he said in his 
memoir: it is not at all a shame, but an achievement to make discoveries at later 
stages in a person’s life, through studying scholars from the past (Kaldor 1986). 
Let’s follow his path.
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